AML Tuesday's Session #39 on:

AMSF Supervisory Findings for FIs

14 November 2023



Introduction



Importance of feedback on Supervisory Findings

- Ensure clear line of communication
- Highlight common weaknesses
- Promote understanding of ML/TF risks
- Awareness of any emerging risks
- Understand the expectations of AMSF
- AMSF will inspect whether such findings have been considered as part of compliance framework
- Review own internal framework and identify if any improvements required
- Improve level of compliance across all sectors
- Avoid supervisory action



Basis for AMSF's Supervisory Findings

- In 2023 AMSF has significantly increased its supervisory engagement in particular through:
- Onsite Inspections
- Focus on Thematic Inspections
- Risk and Compliance meetings
- Ad hoc inspections
- Increased supervisory data requested by AMSF (in particular Strix Returns)
- Outreach/workshops with FIs
- Meetings and ongoing communication with FIs

Through this increased engagement AMSF has obtained a deeper understanding of strengths and weakness in compliance frameworks of FIs.



How AMSF inform FIs of Supervisory Findings

- Important part of AMSF's supervisory strategy is to ensure that supervisory findings are communicated to FIs.
- This is done in the following ways:
 - Inspection Report
 - Supervisory Findings Paper will be issued by AMSF at end of 2023/early 2024 Note: this will give a
 fuller picture to FIs
 - ✤ Also discussed during outreach events and workshops
 - Discussed in Risk and Compliance Meetings and follow up inspections
 - Formal and informal meetings with FIs.
- Supervisory findings also inform targeted guidance issued by AMSF and future thematic inspections or ad hoc inspections



Some Examples of Supervisory Findings in FIs in 2023



Governance, compliance function, AML/CFT policies and procedures

- Improved AML/CFT policies and procedures
- Generic policies and procedures although improvements have been observed
- Group policies implemented not always in line with Monegasque legislation
- Improved number AML/CFT resources



Governance, compliance function, AML/CFT policies and procedures

- Good AML/CFT understanding and appreciation at top
- Senior management review and approval of policies and procedures
- Group policies and procedures consistent and implemented
- Local policies reviewed and amended in line with new AML/CFT Law and OS
- Comprehensive, specific and up to date AML/CFT policies and procedures which covers all AML/CFT obligations in line with Monegasque requirements
- Adequate AML/CFT resources
- Clearly delineated AML/CFT responsibilities within the FI



ML/TF Risk Assessment

- Risk Assessment in place
- Not always comprehensive or specific to business of the individual FI
- Not always taking account of new developments or emerging risks
- Wholesale de-risking
- ML and TF Risk not considered separately





ML/TF Risk Assessment

- Comprehensive ML/TF risk assessment
- Regularly reviewed and updated
- Take into account core risk factors: customer risk, product, service and transaction risk, geographic risk, delivery channel risk.
- Comprehensive methodology
- Conclusions supported by quantitative and qualitative data
- Consideration of TFS (TF and PF)
- ML and TF risks differentiated STRIX survey
- New and emerging risks assessed
- Approval by Senior management



Customer Risk Profile

- Sometimes incomplete risk profiling
- Better understanding of how to risk profile a customer
- Inadequate risk ratings
- Sometimes delayed reviews of customer risk profiles
- Limited information on customer risk ratings for first line of defence staff



Customer Risk Profile

- Clear criteria for customer risk assessments
- Documented
- Scope of CDD and monitoring based on customer risk profile
- Frequency and scope of CDD review based on risk profile and approved list of triggers



CDD

- Incomplete or inadequate CDD gathered
- Failure to identify the BO (thematic inspections of complex structures). Do not go far enough down the ownership chain.
- Generally daily screening of customers
- Third party CDD ultimate responsibility lies with FI and this has been observed by AMSF.
- Improvement in documentation requested re source of wealth and source of funds, but not always clear how this information is used by the FI.



CDD

- Full CDD gathered
- Sanction, PEP and negative media screening prior to establishing business relationship
- Clear procedure to identify and verify BO
- EDD
- Documentary evidence on SOW and SOF in high risk situations which is assessed by the FI
- Review



Ongoing monitoring and identification of suspicious activity

- Automated tools
- Tools parameters not adequately defined
- Group tools had previously been used now more local scenarios included
- Delayed analysis of alerts Failure to update customer profile and customer due diligence with details received during assessment or investigations.
- Not always adequate documentation for closure of alerts



Ongoing monitoring and identification of suspicious activity (continued)

- Improved RBA for scenarios
- Screening at onboarding stage
- Screening of customers and transactions
- Lists transaction screening
- No training/inadequate training on screening tool
- Delay in resolving/processing sanction screening alerts
- No way of identifying whether relates to TF or PF through the tool



Ongoing monitoring and identification of suspicious activity

- Customers subjected to ongoing monitoring in line with RBA.
- Enhanced monitoring where required
- Monitoring scenarios adapted in line with risk
- Comprehensive analysis of potentially suspicious transactions
- Adequate human resources for monitoring



Suspicious Transaction Reporting

- Inordinate delays in reporting
- Quality of reports
- No documentary evidence for closure of alerts



Suspicious Transaction Reporting

- Effective transaction monitoring systems
- Structured internal process to report suspicious transactions
- Documented
- Attempted and completed transactions
- Written procedure to avoid tipping off which is followed
- Specific indicators and red flags
- Timely responses to requests for further information
- Training on suspicious transaction reporting



Training and Human Resources

- Training conducted
- Training sometimes tends to be generic
- Training mostly included in policies and procedures
- Lack of focus on TF
- Training on TFS has been conducted in some cases



Training and Human Resources

- Comprehensive training which is conducted on regular basis
- Specific and targeted to role
- Documented record of training
- Specific training for senior management and Board members
- Training included in policies and procedures
- Adequate AML/CFT resources



What FI's need to do now....

Have regard to these findings and review own internal AML/CFT control framework to identify if any

improvements required.





Thank you for your time

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Next Session:

28.11.2023

Topic:

Evolving AML/CFT Risks

Today's Host: Jan Bellenghi

Today's Presenter: Elaine Duignan