AML Tuesday's Session #41 on:

Evolving AML/CFT Risks

28 November 2023



Discussion Topics



Type of Money Laundering Emerging Risks



Emerging Risks in Terrorism Financing



How the Private Sector Can Identify Emerging Risks



What to do in Practice




Characteristics of Emerging Risks

- Large scale events
- Often, arises from global trends
- Beyond our capacity of control
- Can cross geographic borders, industries, and sectors
- Difficult to quantify the impact
- Hard to predict
- Traditional risk management identification and assessment process may not work



AML/CFT Risk Management - Key Controls





Emerging Risks - Money Laundering





Emerging Risk - Blockchain/Virtual Assets

High Transaction Speed

Global Reach

Principality

Anonymity

Possibility to bypass centralized regulators and law enforcement

Type of assets – privacy coins

Non-fungible Tolkens NFTs

Crypto Assets



Russian Sanctions Evasion – Red Flags

- The Use of Pooled Investment Vehicles in CRE Fin Cen Alert
- The use of a private investment vehicle that is based offshore to purchase CRE and that includes PEPs or other foreign nationals (particularly family members or close associates of sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies) as investors.
- Multiple limited liability companies, corporations, partnerships, or trusts are involved in a transaction with ties to sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies, and the entities have slight name variations.
- The use of legal entities or arrangements, such as trusts, to purchase CRE that involves friends, associates, family members, or others with a close connection to sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies.
- Ownership of CRE through legal entities in multiple jurisdictions without a clear business purpose.
- Private investment funds or other companies that submit revised ownership disclosures to financial institutions showing sanctioned individuals or PEPs that previously owned more than 50 percent of a fund changing their ownership to less than 50 percent.
- The purchase, sale, donation, or legal ownership transfer of high-value real estate in the name of a foreign legal entity, shell company, or trust, especially if the transaction: (i) is far above or below fair market value, (ii) involves all-cash transfers, or (iii) is funded by a third party with a known nexus to sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies.
- Transactions involving PMSJ trading companies, particularly in Asia, and firms with a nexus to sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies



Environmental Crime Risks

- There is no universal definition of environmental crime; it generally refers to criminal offenses harming the environment including illegal logging, illegal land clearance, illegal mining, and waste trafficking.
- Environmental crime is generating around USD 110 to 281 billion in criminal gains each year
- These activities become illegal when: (i) undertaken without state permission, (ii) when contracts and concessions are secured through corruption or intimidation, (iii) when services involve fraud (e.g., false treatment of hazardous waste), and (iv) for logging/mining, when extraction contravenes agreed terms, such as quotas or other requirements.



Environmental Crime Risks – Red Flags

- Use of Front Companies to Co-mingle Illegal and Legal Proceeds
- Use of Shell Companies to Hide Beneficial Owners
- Transfers from a country where the gold smelters are located to source countries for gold, and almost immediate cash withdrawal of the majority of the transfer.
- Companies operating in the logging sector with frequent transactions to offshore financial centers.
- Individuals and entities are cited in newspapers, NPO investigative reports or reports by international organizations

- (public and confidential) as being involved in bribery, corruption, environmental or other organized crimes.
- Customers with mining licenses operating in or around active conflict zones.
- Individual identified as a manager or director of several companies linked to environmental extraction.



Environmental Crime Risks

COUNTRY A COUNTRY B COUNTRY C OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTRE * Government agency Parent issues license = company Company structure with a PEP or Britiery of government officials PEP family member as Director (to obtain licences) (Forced) labour **COUNTRY E** cash, MSB mobile pay DESTINATION COUNTRY Legal concession Refiner Comingled COUNTRY D TRANSIT COUNTRY Goods smuggled Source altered to give appearance of legitimacy Goods smuggled _ Path A _ Path B _ Path C

Figure 2.7. Example of Criminal Supply Chain for Illegal Mining



Emerging Risks - TF



Terrorism Financing

- Fundraising through social media
- Collecting terrorism-related funds through crowdfunding techniques
- Fundraising through virtual currencies
- Charitable organizations and foundations

Collection



- Transshipment of goods
- Cash smuggling
- Funds transfers from/to jurisdictions impacted by terrorism or considered terrorist hotspots

Movement




- Terrorist attack
- Maintenance of terrorist networks and infrastructure
- Investment of terrorismrelated funds

Use





Terrorist Attacks
Completed, foiled, failed,
And arrests on suspicion of
Terrorism in the EU per type of
terrorism 2019-2021





Emerging TF Risks

1

Social Media/Crowdfunding

Donating money through easy-to-access crowdfunding online campaigns set up for an actual real cause

Analyze

Online Wallet Activity,

Customers – Media Search

2

Virtual Currency

The use of digital currency, cryptocurrency and virtual assets service providers (VASPs) enables terrorist and extremist groups to increasingly misuse crowdfunding

Analyze

Virtual Activity in Terms of Customers and Transactions. VASP Customers

3

NPOs

NPOs in the past have been misused by terrorist organizations as conduits for TF or to conceal/obscure clandestine diversion of funds for terrorist purposes.

Analyze

NPO Activity, NPOs operating in border regions close to TF Risk Jurisdictions.



Terrorism Financing - Cases

- Case of Ali Shukri Amin was sentenced to 11 years in prison to be followed by a lifetime for support to the ISIL. He admitted to using Twitter to provide advice and encouragement to ISIL and its supporters. Amin, who used the Twitter handle @Amreekiwitness, provided instructions on how to use bitcoin, a virtual currency, to mask the provision of funds to ISIL, as well as facilitation to ISIL supporters seeking to travel to Syria to fight with ISIL. Amin's Twitter account boasted over 4 000 followers and was used as a pro-ISIL platform during the course of over 7,000 tweets.
- **Crowdfunding** On February 4th, 2022, GoFundMe closed a campaign supporting the <u>"Freedom Convoy"</u> due to concern it had become an "occupation" and amidst widespread reports of violence. Crowdfunding has also supported <u>Islamic State (IS) operatives</u> in Syria. In total the crowdfunding page raised 10 million dollars.



Emerging Risk – VA Red Flag Indicators

Transferring large amount of VAs to multiple foreign VASPs with High risk Jurisdictions

Incoming Transactions from many wallets in relatively small amounts

Entities that operate as an unregistered/unlicensed VASP on peer-to-peer exchange websites. Receiving funds from or sending funds to VASPs whose CDD/KYC are weak, and are not subject to AML/CFT supervision



Emerging Risk - NPO Red Flag Indicators

Frequent use of cash

Donations for brothers/struggle/different words

Ambiguity about the purpose of NPOs or inconsistencies between the purpose and actual activities

Unnecessarily complex financial and transactional structures within NPOs, leading to the lack of transparency for the origin and or use of funds



Emerging TF Risks - Hamas Financing

- On October 18th, OFAC Designated Hamas Operatives and Financial Facilitators
- Qatar Based financial facilitator managing secret assets of Hamas investment portfolio with close ties with Iran, Key Hamas Commander, and a Gaza-based virtual currency exchange.
- In addition to the funds Hamas receives from Iran, its global portfolio of investments generates vast sums of revenue through its assets, estimated to be worth hundreds of millions of dollars, with companies operating in Sudan, Algeria, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries.
- The companies in Hamas's portfolio have operated under the guise of legitimate businesses and their representatives have attempted to conceal Hamas's control over their assets.
- Hamas's Investment Office, held assets estimated to be worth more than \$500 million, including companies operating in Sudan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and UAE.



Hamas Financing – FinCen Alert


- A customer conducts transactions with a Money Services Business (MSB) or other financial institution, including one that offers services in virtual currency, that operates in higher risk jurisdictions tied to Hamas activity, and is reasonably believed or suspected to have lax customer due diligence (CDD) requirements, opaque ownership, or otherwise fails to comply with anti-money laundering/combatting the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) best practices.
- A customer conducts transactions that originate with, are directed to, or otherwise involve entities that are shell corporations, general "trading companies," or other companies that have a nexus with Iran or other Iran-supported terrorist groups, such as Hizballah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
- A customer that is a charitable organization or nonprofit organization (NPO) solicits
 donations but does not appear to provide any charitable services or openly supports
 Hamas's terrorist activity or operations. In some cases, these organizations may post on
 social media platforms or encrypted messaging apps to solicit donations, including in
 virtual currency.
- A customer that is a charitable organization or NPO receives large donations from an unknown source over a short period of time and then sends significant wire transfers or checks to other charitable organizations or NPOs.



Emerging Risks – What we do in Practice.



What Should FIs and DNFBPs do with Emerging Risks?





How to Identify Emerging Risks

NRA/SRA

Risks Identified and Addressed in NRA/SRA

TRANSACTION MONITORING

New Patterns Based on **Customer Transactions**



EU Publications

Publications of Other Jurisdictions

FATF

BUSINESS RISK ASSESSMENT

Identified Trends and Developments

BIG PICTURE ANALYSES

Trends and Patterns Based on Analyses of More Generic Data



Risk Response



BRA Review

Based on Identified Emerging Risks Review BRA



Review CRA

Is there a need to adjust the methodology and introduce new risk factors



Review Transactions and Customers

Select Customer Profiles

Select Transactions based on Emerging Risks



Review Existing Controls

Are Controls in place to Address Emerging Risks



Risk Response

Periodic Analyses of funds flows (Wire Transfers/Money Remittance/P2P) to and from HR jurisdictions, verifying customer profiles and activity

Cash operations by residents from High-Risk Jurisdictions

Virtual Currency Transactions
– identifying customers with
high volume/number of
operations. Matching Virtual
Currency Transactions with
follow-up outgoing fund
transfers

Online Platform Merchant Monitoring – Card Operations Analyses of customer base in Trade business (fund transfer jurisdictions, comparisons with previous periods) Review NPOs and Charity Organizations – if you have up-to-date activity information, is the activity in line with the profile?

Re-assess Complex Corporate
Structures

Review any customers with crowdfunding activity



Implement Mitigating Controls



Risk Appetite

Review to Increase or Decrease



Enhance IT Controls

Introduce new TM Scenarios
Introduce new Real-time Checks



Process Enhancement

Strengthen CDD/EDD
Increase Periodic Review





Thank you for your time

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Next Session:

12.12.2023

Topic:

Monaco's Follow-Up Process with the FATF

Today's Host: Jan Bellenghi

Today's Presenter: Tamar Goderdzishvili